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THE NON-FEDERAL LAW ADMINISTERED
IN FEDERAL COURTS.

The 3rd Article of the Constitution of the United
States confers on the United States judicial power in certain classes of cases. No case can be decided without
observance by the courts of certain principles of procedure, certain principles of evidence by which the facts
are to be ascertained, and certain substantive, principles
by which the rights and obligations of the respective parties are defined. Cases are perhaps comparatively rare,
for -the solution of which a considerable number of principles of the last class, are not necessary, and of these
principles, in some classes of cases, all must be found
beyond the Constitution of the United States, the statutes of Congress, and the treaties.
Among the powers of Congress, conferred by Article 1 of the Constitution, after an enumeration of certain specific powers, is the general power "to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers vested by this Con-
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stitution in the government of the United States or in
any department or officer thereof."
It doubtless follows from this, that Congress may
bestow upon the courts a body of procedural rules, a body
of evidential rules, and a body of substantive law.
Congress has legislated in regard to the rules of evidence. Section 858 of the Revised Statutes enacts that
in Federal Courts, no witness shall be excluded because
of color, or because he is a party, except in certain cases.
In all other respects, it declares that "the laws of the
State in which the court is held shall be the rules of decision as to the competency of witnesses" in trials at
common law, in equity and admiralty. The 34th section
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, provides that the laws of
the several States with the exceptions therein mentioned, shall be regarded as the rules of decision in trials at
common law in the courts of the United States.
These rules embrace rules of evidence.' Hence, if a
State Statute makes a notary's certificate evidence, it
will be deemed evidence in a federal court. 2 Endorsements on a promissory note being, by State law, prima
facie to be taken as made by the proper party, they will
be so taken in the courts of the United States.$ The
State statute making parties to suits competent, they
are competent in common law trials in the Federal
courts.4

When the evidence law of a State is not established
by statute, the Federal courts assume the right to lind
what it is, in whatever way seems satisfactorily to them.
They consult the decisions of the State courts, they conVance v. Campbell, 66 U. S. 427; Haussknecht v. Claypool,
66 U. S. 431; Union Pacific R. R, Co. v. Yates, 25 C. C. A. 103.
2

Sims v. Hundley, 6 How. 1.
3McNeal v. Holbrook, 13 Pet. 84.
'Wright v. Bales, 67 U. S. 535; C. F. Ryan v. Binlley, 1 Wall.
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suit English decisions, and the decisions of other States,
and doubtless, their own notions as to what would be a
sensible rule, and they apply such principle as seems
best to them. Hence, although the courts of Iowa permit medical books to be read to the jury as independent
evidence of the opinion mentioned therein, it will not fol
low that the Circuit Court of the United States sitting
in that State may do the same. The Circuit Court of Appeals has decided that the books should not be received. 5
While thus in fact repudiating the State common law of
evidence, the courts persuade themselves that they are
only declaring it more correctly than do the State courts.
If the Federal courts may thus refuse recognition to
the nonstatutory State law of evidence, it is not surprising that Congress may set aside any State rule that it
chooses. In enacting that State law shall be followed by
the Federal courts, it tacitly assumes the power to legislate as it will. Indeed it has expressly excepted those
State laws, the observance of which would be inconsistent with the "statutes of the United States."
It has
enacted that except in certain cases, a party shall not
be incompetent as a witness, and this enactment overrides
a contrary State law.6
The State statutes in regard to evidence then, will
be observed by the Federal courts, until congress passes
inconsistent statutes. The State common-law in respect
to evidence, will be respected by the Federal courts,
"where the question at issue is balanced with doubt." T
In other cases those courts will deduce a rule from the
customary sources to which courts appeal, the decisions
of other States and countries, although the rule deduced
is inconsistent with that of the State courts.
OUnion Pacific Ry. Co. v. Yates, 25 C.C. A. 103.
aPotter v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 163.
7Thayer, C. J.; Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Yates, 25 C. C. A., 103
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Besides the rules of evidence, by means of which
the facts are to be ascertained, there must be criteria of
rights and duties, by the application of which, to .the
facts, the courts may' reach a decision for the plaintiff
or the defendant.
As Congress may impose on the
courts the rules of evidence, whether the same as, or
different from, State rules, so it is clear that Congress
may require the courts to apply the principles of substantive law found in the States, or may prescribe principles of its own formulation. The Act of Sept. 24th,
1789, directed that the laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the
United States otherwise require, or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trial at common law, in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.
By confining this declaration to trials at "common law,"
Congress tacitly concedes that in cases of equity and admiralty, the Federal cburts are at liberty to adopt such
principles as they choose, at least until Congress shall
prescribe some. It is also to be noted that no distinction
is made between the jurisdiction that is founded on the
nature of the inherent questions, and that which is founded on the character of the parties.
By aws of the several States," congress probably
intended, not statutory laws only, but the common law,
the principles propounded by their courts, for otherwise,
since statutes furnish only an insignificant percentage of
the principles needed for the solution of controversies,
Congress would have made an inadequate regulation.
An unwillingness to accept the common law of the States,
as declared in State courts, has been manifested by the
Federal Courts, sometimes from a belief that the State
principles had been mistakenly deduced from conceded
premises, and sometimes doubtless from a desire to effect uniformity of law over the whole area of the United
States, so far as they could.
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In Swift v. Tyson,8 Story, J., desiring not to recognize a principle of the common law of the State of New
York, interpreted the phrase "laws of the several States"
in the judiciary act of 1789, as not embracing the decisions of the State courts. He denied that decisions are
laws. "They are at most, only evidence of what the laws
are, and are not, of themselves laws. They are often
re-examined, reversed and qualified by the courts themselves, whenever they are found to be either defective,
or ill-founded or otherwise incorrect."
Decisions it is true are not laws, except for the parties to the suit. But when the decision is founded on
principles, it is the expression of a purpbse by the courts
to enforce these principles. As law is such, only because
of the purpose of the law executing department, to execute it, the rationes decidendi are as much laws as statutes are. They are alike laws because the courts have
manifested a purpose to enforce them. They are thus
made obligatory upon the subjects of the State.
That the principle propounded by a court is re-examined, qualified or reversed, is not peculiar to such principle. The legislature often does the same. The enactment of a law does not stop legislative investigation into
its wisdom. The judgment, the will of the legislature
may change, or it may discover that the statute ineffectively carries out its intentions. The liability to repeal or
alter a statute, does not make it cease to be law. Neither does the liability to retraction of a principle of decision deprive it of the quality of law, so long as it is unretracted.
Shall the word "laws" in the Judiciary Act be confined to statute laws? Justice Story shrinks from an
interpretation which would involve such great inconveniences. He concedes therefore, that "laws" may be
uon-statutory. What then are the non-statutory State
816 Peters 1.

Dickinson Law Reviw
laws that the Congress requires the Federal Courts to
observe? He variously describes them, as "long established local customs having the force of law;" "rights
and titles to -things having a permanent locality, such as
the rights and titles to real estate, and other matters
immovable and intra-territorial in their nature and character."
What custom is it, that has the force of law? Law
is the source of an obligation; and it is only when some
officer of the State recognizes a custom and resolves to
compel action in conformity with it, or to visit penalties
for non-conformity with it, that it acquires this obligation. The custom is not law, but there may be a law
that people shall observe the custom. Reference is made
to the custom, to define the duty. But, it becomes a
legal duty, by an authority exterior to the custom.
How "long established" must the custom be? Why
is an old custom law, and a young custom, not? Why is
a custom composed of a million repetitions of similar acts
binding, and one composed of five hundred not?
Why select from the vast mass of titles, and rights,
rights and titles to things having a permanent locality,
to land? Are we to understand that a State's common
law concerning the sale, devise, inheritence of land, is to
be respected, and -that concerning the sale or bequest of
cotton, or wheat, or a horse, or a piano, not? Is a State
common law concerning persons, the status of children
and married women, to be held not "law" in the congressional sense?
Justice Story remarks that the act of Congress never
has been supposed by the court, to apply to "questions of
a more general nature, not at all dependent upon local
statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent opertion; for example, to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written instruments, and especially to
questions of general commercial law, where the State
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tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions
as ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon general reasoning and legal analogies, what is the true exposition of
the contract or instrument, or what is the just rule furnished by the principles of commercial law to govern the
case. And we have not now the slightest difficulty in
,holding that this section, upon its true intendment and
construction, is strictly limited to local statutes and local usages of the character before stated, and does not
extend to contracts or other instruments of a commercial nature, the true interpretation and effect whereof
are to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence."
It is -apparent that no clear test is here furnished,
by which we are to determine what non-statutory State
law is to be observed by the courts. A "long established
custom" may apply to contracts, to personal obligations,
to chattels, as well as to land. Is then the long established custom, per se, the law which the Federal Courts
will observe, or is it only such custom as pertains to
land?
The expression "questions of a more general nature"
is discovered on investigation, to have no meaning. The
question before the court, was very special.
It was,
shall, in New York, one who without consideration receives by endorsement a promissory note, as security for
an already existing debt, be able to compel the maker to
pay according to its terms, despite his possession of defences that would be valid against the payee?
What
makes this general? The fact that notes are thus received in Pennsylvnia, Michigan, England, France? Does
the fact that similar transactions may occur in other
States and nations, and similar claims may arise out of
them, make it general? Then, what is not general?
Land exists in Pennsylvania, in Michigan, in England, in
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France. Owners die, intestate or testate. Owners contract to sell, convey, mortgage. Then are we to say that
a question concerning a land title, is general, and that the
decisions of the court of New York in so far as they do
not solve the question as do the courts of other states
and countries, are to be repudiated?
Contracts against the liability of railroad for the
destruction of property by fire caused by the negligence
of its servants, may arise not only in Iowa, but in Ohio,
and Mississippi. Shall then, the Federal courts in Iowa
refuse to accept the decision of the Iowa courts that
such contracts are valid? But it has been decided that
they will accept their decision., Many states have Sunday laws. Shall then, the decision of the courts of Massachusetts, peculiar to them, that one who is riding on Sunday in a railroad train without necessity and not for charity, shall not be permitted to recover damages from the
company, for injuries arising from its negligence, be followed by the Federal courts? But it was followed by
them.o
Municipalities exist in England and in every American state, and accidents arise in all of them, to pedestrians from the defective condition of their streets. But
-the Federal courts will defer to the decision of the courts
of the particular State, as to the liability of the city or
town." Navigable streams exist in many States, and
water is taken from them by riparian owners and others,
but the decision of the Minnesota courts that a municipality may take water from, such a stream without compensating riparian owners, will be respected in the Federal courts.'

2

9

Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 20

Sup. Ct. 33.

10 Bucher v. Chesire R. R., 125 U. S. 5W5.

1
Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U. S. 492.
12St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. Water Commissioners
of St. Paul, 18 Sup. Ct. 1M7.
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Not infrequently expressions are employed by the
court that seem to import that within, a State there may
operate a law getting its authority from a source beyond
the State, though liable to be superseded by State statutory legislation, but not by that legislation with which
all lawyers are familiar, the legislation of the State
courts. In Swift v. Tyson, Story, J., speaks of "commercial jurisprudence," "commercial law". Bradley,
J.,11
speaks of "commercial law and general jurispru.dence," and Story, J., remarks that "the law respecting
negotiable instruments may be truly declared to be in a
great measure, not the law of a single country only, but
of the commercial world." It is evident that there may
be commercial law, in the sense in which there can be a
law of crime, or of real property, or of contracts. Contracts, crimes, commercial transactions may be the subjects about which the law concerns itself. But if Pennsylvania has a law about crimes, it is Pennsylvania criminal law, and if it has a law about negotiable properties
of commercial paper, it is the Pennsylvania law of negotiable paper. How is -the law about crime in Pennsylvania, more the law of Pennsylvania, than the law about
negotiable paper in Pennsylvania, is the law of Pennsylvania.
It may be that a considerable number of states enforce similar principles, concerning crime and concerning negotiable paper. Does it result, that the law ceases
to be the law of each state, and becomes a general law?
The content of the law may be the same in several, but
the legislature will of one state never becomes that of
another, nor does the coincidence of the respective legislative wills of several states, give rise to a unitary will
of all of them. The commercial law of England would
be its law, though it were exactly like the commercial
law of France, or Germany, or the United States, and it
18Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20.
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would be the law there because of the will of England
expressed by some organ, court or parliament. Likewise, Pennsylvania has its law about negotiable paper,
whether Ohio and Maryland, New Jersey, New York
and Delaware have a similar law or not.
Absolutely incomprehensible is the language of Harlan, J., in Railroad Co. v. National Bank," that the "general commercial law" exists throughout the Union, "except where it might have been modified or changed by
some local statute." "It is a law not peculiar to one
State, or dependent upon local authority, but one arising
out of the usages of the commercial world." He concedes that a statute could change it. But, how, if it is
not dependent upon local authority? Is the legislature
of a State not a "local authority?" And how did this
"general commercial law" become law in New York or
Massachusetts? It has not been enacted by constitution
or statute. Did it push itself into these States, without
their consent? Does it impose legal obligations by its
own inherent power? The law is a body of abstractions,
an ideal to be followed by men in commercial transactions. But what has made this ideal, law? Surely the
enforcement of it, by legal sanctions, which are applied
by State tribunals.
If -the courts of a State had shown a purpose to en.
force a given principle merely because they supposed it,
mistakenly, to be the principle adopted in England, or in
a majority of the common law jurisdictions, and a Federal
court sitting in it, should believe that the State court
had propounded it under this mistake, there might be a
justification for its rejection of the erroneous inference,
The State court would really have adopted two propositions, (a) that which is law in England upon this point
shall be law in this State, (b) this is the law in England.
The Federal court would not be without warrant for its
14102

U. S. 14.
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position that the first proposition was the one that was
really enacted into the law by the court, and might then,
discovering the error in the -second proposition, rectify
it. But it is on no such ground that it has assumed the
right to repudiate the law as declared by the State
courts.
The Federal courts, sitting within a State, even when
they are not applying Federal law, assert that they are
co-ordinate with, not inferior to, the State courts.
Hence their claim to declare the law, that is, to make the
non-statutory law of the State, for all persons who may
become litigants before them. 5 They have declared this
law inconsistently with the State courts, in a number of
cases.
They have refused to accept from the State
courts, the principle that an endorsee of a negotiable
note, for collateral security for an existing debt, is not
a purchaser for value' 6 ; that a carrier may validly exempt himself by contract from liability for loss of goods
from the negligence of his servants ;17 that an employer
is liable to an employee for an injury caused by the negligence of a fellow employee ;18 that a property owner by
making a contract to excavate a street and construct a
building, may devolve on the contractor, and himself escape, liability for an accident arising from the failure to
put out lights to warn pedestrians.'1 The Federal courts
have refused to adopt interpretations put by State courts
on stipulations often recurring in fire insurance poli15Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20.
16Railroad Co. v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 14; Swift v. Tyson,
16 Pet. 1; Oates v. National Bank, 100 U. S. 239.
1T
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, etc. R. R. 20 Sup. Ct.
83; Liverpool Steamship Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S, 397;
R. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U. S. 357.
lBaltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Bough, 149 U. S. 368; Hough v.
Railway, 100 U. S. 213.
19Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black 418.

Dickinson Law Review
and on contracts by a railroad company whereby
its liability for safe carriage beyond its own line is to be
determined,21 and on a policy of marine insurance, as respects what shall be a total loss. 1 We have seen that
Story, J., enumerated among the cases in which the Federal courts decline to be bound by the decisions of the
State courts, "the construction of ordinary contracts or
other written instruments." 2
The judiciary act requires, as we have seen, the
Federal .courts to regard "the laws of the several states,"
when not displaced by the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States, "as rules of deciiion, in trials
at common law." The statute law of the State is, it is
conceded, thus enacted by Congress, into law for the
Federal courts sitting therein, in common law trials.,
The statute law thus made a rule of decision, may
abolish provisions even of the so-called law,' or of the
common law of evidence. 5 It may prohibit worldly work
on Sunday.8 It may prohibit usury." It may bar actions
on contracts or for torts, on account of the lapse of time.8
It may in short cover the whole possible field of law,
save so much as is excluded by the Federal Constitution,
statutes and treaties.
In applying a State statute it is necessary to ascercies,20

20Carpenter v.Providence Washington Ins. Co.: 16 Peters 495.
21Myrick v. Michigan Central R R., 107 U. S. 102.
'Washburn 1dManf. Co. v. Reliance Marine Ins Co., 178 U. S. 1.
2SrVift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1.
3Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1; Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U. S.
213; Railway Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101; B. & 0. R. R,v. Baugh,
149 U. S. 368.
40ates v. National Bank, 100 U. S. 239.
sWright v. Bales, 67 U. S. 535; Wilcox v. Hunt, 13 Petors,
378; Ryan v. Bindley, 1 Wall. 66.
eBucher v. Chesire R. R. Co., 125 U. S. 555.
7Missouri Trust Co. v. Krunseig, 19 Sup. Ct. R. 179,
8
Luffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black -599; Bauserman v. Blunt,
147 U. S. 64'7.

Dickinson Law Review
tain whether it is valid, and, what is its interpretation?
To determine its validity, the Constitution of the State
or such principles as, though not distinctly expressed
therein, may be assumed to be limitations on legislative
power, must be applied to it. If the Supreme Court of
the State has made the application, and pronounced the
statute valid or void, its decision will be followed by the
Federal Court.9
If there has been no decision by the
State court, when the question is presented to the Federal court it must and will make a decision, and, the Supreme Court on appeal, will exercise its own Judgment
on the question although, meantime, the State court may
have decided it.1o
When parties have entered into a contract in reliance
on a statute upon whose constitutionality there has been
no decision of the State Court, the Federal court, in deciding whether the statute is constitutional, will not be
bound by decisions of the State court, pronounced since
the making of the contract. 11 A fortiori will the Federal courts not follow a State decision rendered after
the making of the contract, and declaring the statute
void, which reverses a decision made prior to the making of the contract. 12
The validity of a law authorizing taxation to aid in
the construction of a railroad depending on the question
whether money spent for a railroad is spent for a public
use, the Federal courts will decline to accept the decision of the State court. "Whether," says Story, J., "a

OWilkes County v. Coler, 180 U. S. 506; 23 Sup. Ct. R. 738;
Stanley County v. Coler, 23 Sup. Ct. R. 811; Elmwood v. 'Marcy,
92 U. S. 289.
1

OBurgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20; Pease v. Peck, 59 U. S.

595.
"lFolsom v. Township of Ninety-Six, 169 U. S. 611; Township
of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U. S. 666.
12Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 86 U. S. 175; Cf. Wilkes County v.
Coler, 180 U. S. 529; Ohio Life & Trust Co. v. Db0lt, 16 How. 432.
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use is public or private, is not a question of constitutional
construction. It is a question of general law,"' 3 ignoring
the fact that there is no "general law" save Federal
law; that all other law is Michigan law or Illinois law,
or New York law, and that a law does not become general because Michigan and Illinois and New York, have or,
in the judgment of this or that jurist, ought to have, a
similar law.
As the Federal courts in certain circumstances decline to receive the interpretation put on the State statutes by the State courts, so they may refuse to accept
the decision of the court, as to whether certain words
are a part of the statute.'4
When a statute is constitutional, its meaning must be
ascertained. When the State courts have interpreted it,
the Federal courts will accept this interpretation. It
is said to be "as binding upon the courts of the United
States as the text,""5 and if the State courts adopt new
views as to the proper construction of the statute, the
Federal courts will follow the latest settled adjudication.1 But this principle is subject to exceptions similar to those in respect to the constitutionality of a statute. Ifprior to interpretation by the State court, contracts have been entered into in reliance on the statute's
bearing one sense, the Federal courts will not feel bound
by the later decisions of the State courts giving it a different sense. 7 A fortiori will the Federal court not
adopt a later decision of a State court if a contract has
been entered into, or other act done in reliance on an
earlier inconsistent interpretation.' 8 If the Federal court
"Olcott v. Supervisors, 83 U. S. 678.
"-Pease v. Peck, 59 U. S. 595.
'-Leffingwell v. Warren. 2 Black 599.
161d; Green v. McNeil's Lessee, 6 Peters 291.
17 Stanley County v. Coler, 23 Sup. Ct. R. 811.
l8 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U. S. 175.
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for the first time interprets a State statute, the Supreme
Court on appeal, will not condemn this interpretation in
deference to an intervening decision of the State court,' 9
and if the Circuit Court of the United States follows the
interpretation of the State court, the Supreme Court on
appeal will not reverse its judgment because, since the
rendition thereof, the State court has changed its opin20
ion.
The application of a statute may require the invoking of various principles.
The promulgation of these
principles by a State court is not necessarily binding on
the Federal court. An instance is found in Town of
Venice v. Murdock. 21 A statute of the State of New
York authorized the town of Venice to borrow money on
bonds in order to aid the construction of a railroad. It
required the assent of two-thirds of the resident taxpayers of the town to the borrowing of money for this
purpose. This assent was to be expressed in writing
on which was to be put the affidavit of the supervisor
and commissioners that the persons whose names were
subscribed were two-thirds of the taxpayers. Although
the courts of New York had held under similar statutes,
that the bondholder seeking to enforce payment was
bound to prove that two-thirds of the taxpayers had assented, otherwise than by means of this affidavit, the
Federal courts refused to accept this view, saying that
as the State court had asserted "this as a general proposition" (whatever that may mean), there was "no such
case of construction of a State statute by State courts
as requires us to yield our own convictions of the right
and blindly follow the lead of others, eminent as we freeIOPease v. Peck, .59 U. S. 595; Burgess v. Selig-man, 107 U.
S. 20.
2oMorgan v. Curtenius, 61 U. S. 1; Contra, Moores v. National
Bank, 104 U. S.625; Kibbe v. Ditto, 93 U. S. 674,
2192 U. S. 494.
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ly concede they are."23 The Federal courts will not be
bound by the decisions of the State courts as to the effect of the civil war upon the running of their statutes
4
of limitations.2
We have already intimated that the Federal courts
manifest more cheerful acquiescence in State decisions
concerning real-property than in those concerning some
other matters. So called "settled" rules of property in
land established by State decisions, will be respected by
them.25
They will observe the State decisions concerning mortgages, 26 concerning the recording acts,"' concerning the conclusiveness of one judgment in ejectment.2
The constitutional law'yer who surveys the Constitution and the decisions of the court discovers a vast
as yet unused power in Congress and the Federal courts
whose existence is not generally suspected. 'The ratio
of the litigation that is drawn to the Federal courts to
the entire mass of litigation is steadily increasing and is
susceptible of indefinite augmentation.
Over all this
litigation Congress 'has unchallengeable power. It may
prescribe the rules of procedure, the rules of evidence
and the rules which determine the rights and duties of
litigants. It can if it chooses, build up a real estate law,
an inheritance, a law of contracts, a law of torts. It
2aThe Supreme Court also rejected the proposition of the
State eourt that an act empowering a tofwn to borrow money and
give bonds therefor, for the purpose of paying an improvement
company, does not authorize the delivery of the bonds directly to
the company.
24Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532; The Protector, 9 Wall. 687;
'Huntingdon v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657.
25Lowndes v. Board of Trustees, 14 Sup. Ct. R. 758; Herdin
v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371; Gage v. Pumpelly, 116 U. S. 454; Bondurant v. Watson, 103 U. S,283.
26Berdey v. Townsend, 109 U. S. 665.
'Townsend v. Todd, 91 U. S. 452.
2
Fquator Co. v. Hall, 106 U. S,85.

Dickinson Law Review
has chosen thus far in common law matters for the most
part to adopt State legislation. But, in some cases, it
has overridden State legislation. There can be no doubt
that it may, if it will, override it altogether. In equity
proceedings the law of the State is more fully ignored.
Congress, thus far, has only very partially inveded
the sphere of the State law.
In thus refraining, it
has given scope for the initiative of the federal courts.
They are 'building up a body of law to be administered
within the States, which is a real Federal common law,
and which is capable of indefinite expansion at the cost
of the peculiar law of the respective States. Thus far
they have repudiated important elements of the States'
law of torts, of contracts, of 'evidence. There is no power capable of imposing limits on the growth of this indirect legislation, save their own "comity and good sense."-,
This process which will prove to be secular, is constant
and silent and is but a part of a vast and resistless movement towards the reduction of the importance. of the
State and the greater coarctation of their powers. The
reduced importance of the States, however, will not,
we may hope, be wholly without compensations.
WM. TRICKETT.
Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
ABurgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20.
*Reprinted from the 40th American l4aw Review.
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MOOT COURT
MORGAN v. C. V. R. R.
Negligence--Railroads--Attempt to Board' Moving Train-Contributory Negligence
STATEMENT OF FAUITS
Morgan, intending to become a passenger on a C. V. R. R.
train, jumped upon the step of a closed vestibuled car of a moving train and clung to the hand bars. After the train was traveling at full speed, the conductor saw the plaintiff and realized
the danger, but did not open the door of the car or stop the train.
Soon afterward, the plaintiff, becoming completely exhausted,
fell from the train. The defendant states that before the plaintiff can recover he must prove (1) that the defenklant was subjected to a legal duty toward the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant
failed to perform that legal duty; (3) that the defendant's failure
to perform that legal duty produced the result complained of; and
(4) that the plaintiff himself was not negligent.
Campbell, for the plaintiff.
Olshefsky, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SHEA, J. To render the company liable, the company shall
be guilty of some negligence which, mediately or imamediately,
produced or enhanced -the injury; and the plaintiff shall not have
been guilty of any want of ordinary care and prudence, which
directly or indirectly contributed to the injury; since no one can
recover for any injury of which his own negligence was in whole,
or in part, the proximate cause. Passenger Ry. Co. v. Bandron,
92 P0. 479. This rule permits recovery -where the plaintiff was
negligent, if there was no causal connection between his negligence and the injury. "Although the plaintiff's misconduct may
have contributed remotely to the injury, if the defendant's misconduct was the immediate cause of it, and with the exercise of
prudence he might have prevented it, he is not excused." 2 Redfield on Rail., Sect. 193.
Boarding a moving train is without a doubt a negligent and
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dangerous act, 'but if it is successful and the negligent party gets
safely upon the car it will not justify the subsequent negligence
of the company or its servants, by -which he is injured. Sharrer
v. Paxton, et al., 171 Pa. 26. It was there said by Justice McCollum: "The peril involved in getting there was passed, and the
negligence or misconduct of which the plaintiff was the victim
was not included in the risks to which his position exposed him."
Morgan reached the car in safety, his negligence ended there,
and the negligence of the defendant in not opening the door was
a subsequent act which was not included in the risk of getting
on the train. Ordinarily, contributory negligence is a complete
defense in an action for injuries. This defense ceases to be such,
however, when, after discovery of the danger to 'which the passenger's negligence exposed him, the carrier still had an opportunity
to avoid the accident by the exercise of the requisite care, and
yet failed to take advantage of the last clear chance. Chicago
City Ry. Co. v. Schmidt, 75 N. E. 383. The defendant safw Morgan's position and knew that he would sooner or later fall off.
The conductor had ample opportunity to take him into the car,
but he did not. That might he considered as a constructive ejectment, for the defendant could easily have seen that Morgan could
not have remained long on the train in that position, and as such
it was a -dangerous ejectment. The defendant is liable for any
injuries which may result from such an ejectment. Arnold v.
P. R. R. Co., 115 Pa. 136.
In view of the above cited cases, we thiink the defendant is liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. Judgment is readered accordingly.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
It is conceded that, according to the prevalent morality, the
defendant railroad through Its representative, the conductor, owed
to the plaintiff the moral duty of assisting the plaintiff to extricate himself from his dangerous position, and the question in
this case is whether this duty is to be declared a legal kuty.
The plaintiff (was not a passenger nor did there exist between him and the railroad's representative the relation of child
and parent, mivfe and husband, etc., 'which is recognized as giving
rise, in cases like the present, to the duty to act. The only relation between the plaintiff and the conductor was that both were
human beings.
The spirit of reform which for the past six hundred years
has 'been -bringing our law more and more into harmony with
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moral principles has not yet achieved its perfect work, aTuO perhaps it is too early to declare, generally, that one who fails to
interfere to save another from impending death or great bodily
harm, iwhen he might do so with little or no inconvenience to himself, and death or great bodily harm follows as a consequence of
his inaction, shall make compensation for the resulting injury.
The great ethical advance twhich the law has -made in the past
should, however, serve as an encouragement and a warrant for
efforts at future advancement. And if in cases like the -present,
where the existence of a moral duty is universally recognized,
there can be found authority for translating that duty into a legal
iduty, such translation should be effected.
In a recent ease in Georgia, Southern R. R. v. Sewell, 9) S. E.
94, in which the facts were similar to those of the -present Case,
the court said: "It is true that the plaintiff voluntarily assmned
the dangerous position in which -he was found and neither the
railroad nor the conductor could have been held liable for any
injury to him resulting from his action in such a position until the
fact of this position was discovered, but then, if either through
wanton negligence or from careless disregard for -his safety
nothing Wais done to remove him from his place of peril * * *
both the railroad and the conductor could be held liable."
If the plaintiff ha, been lying upon the track and the conductor after seeing him, could have stopped the train and failed
to do so, the railroad wuld have been liable, and it hould, we
thinjd, be held likewise liable in the present case.

KEELER v. RAILROAD COMPANY
Negligence--Railroad Companies--Infants--Duty of CompanyAttempt to Save Life-Contributory Negligence
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A child, four years old, got on a track of the defendant company. A train was moving toward it, but it could have been seen
from the locomotive in time to stop the train. Keeler, net related to the chiM, saw it and rushed to it and threw it from the
track, but in so doing, was struck by the locomotive and severely
hurt. He alleges that (1) the railroad -company was negligent
in not seeing the child -and stopping the train; (2) that he had
a right to do what ke did to save the child; and (3) that he has
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the same right to recover as the child could have had, had it
been hurt.
Sheedy, for the plaintiff.
Todd, for the Idefendant.
OPMTNO(N OF THE COURT
SALSBURG, J. There are three questions to be determined
in the case at bar before there can be a recovery for the plaintiff.
First, it must be shown that the defendant company was negligent; second, that the plaintiff acted in a prudent manner in saving the child and that his acts did not amount to rashness; and
third, that if the child's conduct amounted to negligence, that it
could not be imputekl to its rescuer.
The first proposition is easily disposed of. There is very little doubt that the defendant was negligent in not halting its train;
for from the facts stated, if the engineer had been on the alert,
he Would have had sufficient time to so do. Where one has ample opportunity to prevent an injury and defaults by his own lack
of diligence, he is presumed to be responsible for mishaps which
result from his inadvertance.
This is substantiated in Tate v.
Phila. R. T. Co., 244 Pi. 74.
Before taking up the second point, which is the vital question,
we will discuss the last mentioned element which 'will necessitate
but a few words. Can the negligence of the child, if there 'was
any, be imputed to the plaintiff? Erie City Railway Co. v.
Schuster, 113 Pa. 412, holds that where a four year old child is
run over by a street car, no question of contributory negligence
can arise. See also Counizzarri v. Phila. & R. R. Co., 248 Pa. 474.
Hence, if the child cannot be guilty of negligence, its conduct can
have no ,bearing on the plaintiff's case, for we cannot impute
something which does not exist. It was held in Corbin v. Phila.,
195 Pa. 461, that contributory negligence, even when such a case
does exist, cannot be imputed to one who rescues another from
imminent danger.
The question on which this case depends is discussed in Corbin v. Phila., 195 Pa. 461. In that case the city of Philadelphia
dug a deep trench within the city limits. At the bottom of the
treifch rwere some gas pipes, from which a large quantity of gas
escaped, so that it was extremely dangerous to be in or about,
the opening of the trench. The trench was left unguarded, and
there ras no notice to warn the public of the danger.
Some
school children, who were playing ball in a neighboring lot,
knocked the ball into the trench, and it rolled to the bottom. One
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of the children klescended a ladder standing in the trench, for tho
purpose of getting the ball. He was overcome by the gas, and lay
prostrated at the bottom. The plaintiff's son seeing the danger
the boy was in, quickly started down the ladder after him, -butwas
overcome by the gas and died. The first boy survived and came
to the top unassisted. The plaintiff was allowed to recover. It
was there said by Justice Brown: "One who voluntarily incurs
peril caused by the negligence of another, in oder to save the life
of the one imperiled by the same negligence, is -not barred from
recovery upon the ground of his own contributory negligence. The
law has so high regard for human life, that it will not impute
negligence to an effort to preserve it, unless made under such
circumstances as to constitute rashness in the judgment of prudent ipersons."
The above decision is conclusive of the ease at bar. Judgment is therefore rendered accordingly.
OPINION OF THE SUPRUME COURT
A proper disposition of this case required that the questions, (1) whether the klefendant was negligent and (2) whether
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, should be
submitted to the jury. (1) Piepke v. P. & R. R. Co., 242 Pa.
321; (2) Corbin v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 461.
The learned court below was not required to declare, nor
would it have been justified in declaring as a matter of law, that
either the defendant or the plaintiff was guilty of negligence.
The third contention of the plaitiff cannot be sustained. The
question .whether the plaintiff was guilty of negligence is not the
same as the question whether the child was guilty of negligence.
The plaintiff anay have been guilty of negligence in attempting to
rescue a child to whom contributory negligence could not be imputed.

HAMMOND v. COAL CO.
Negligence-- Preparation of Coal for Market-Control of Volumes of Coal Dust--Measure of Damages
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant coal company owned a tract of coal and was
occupied in raising the coal, breaking and preparing it for market.
In so doing vast quantities of coal dust were created which
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spread on neighboring houses -belonging to the plaintiff, greatly
injuring them.
The court instructed, the jury that, (1) the defendant had a right to raise, break and prepare the coal for market, and to inflict such damage to neighboring property as was
unavoidable; (2) but if devices existed by the use of which the
damage could be avoided or lessened, .the defendant was bound to
use such device, and not using it would be negligence; (3) the
burden was upon the plaintiff to show the defendant's negligence; and (4) the measure of damages would be the cost of restoring the plaintiff's property to its former condition; provided
that this cost did not exceed the value of the property, if it exceeded that value, that value would be the damages.
Campbell, for the plaintiff.
Healey, for the defendant.
OBINION OF THE COURT
LOFTUS, J. In the case before us there is no complaint by
the appellant that the business of the appellee is unlawful, or
that it is doing anything beyond its corporate powers, causing
them loss. The complaint is, that after the coal is taken from
the land and brought to the surface, the coal company, in its artificial breaking, separation and preparation of the same for the
market, has been negligent in not controlling the large quantity
of dust created in such preparation, and that through its negligence -in failing to so control the dust, it has resulted in idamage
to the appellant. The instructions of the lower court were assigned as error.
To approach the case logically, we shall discuss the assignments of error seriatim. The first error assigned, i. e., that the
defendant may inflict such damage to neighboring -property aa is
unavoidable, cannot be sustained. Such charge is in accord 'with
our law, which is clearly stated in Penn. Coal Co. v. Sanderson,
113 Pa. 126, and Penna. R. Co. v. Lippincott, 116 Pa. 472. The
court in both cases held that if a person, in the lawful exercise of
dominion over his property, and in the absence of malice or negligence, inflicts an injury upon another's property, -the injury is
damnum absque injuria, and the latter must submit to his fate,
-without his being able to recuperate himself for this loss.
The second assignment of error might in itself have a tendency to cause a wrongful impression in the minds of the jurors,
as in the case of Harvey v. Coal Co., 201 Pa. 63, a case similar
to the one at bar, where the court asked the jury: "Could the
defendant by any other device than the one that it has in. use
there have prevented the injury to the plaintiff's property? It
was there held that such a question intimates to the jury that
they might find that some other device could have been adopted

Dickinson Law fleview
and gives them a license to invent one themselves, and to find that
the defendant was negligent in not having himself invented and
used one like it. This objection, however, we think, does not a1ply to -the present case, for the learned court -below specifically
stated that the device must be in existence. This implied that
the device -must be such as proved by experience a practical and
working one. The court below was in a better position to perceive the facts which brought about the suit, and this charge, considered in that light, we think mias correct. At least it was not
such a clear error or abuse of discretion as would justify a re.
versal.
The third assignment must also be affirmed. That it is the
plaintiff's kI ty to shorw negligence on the part of the defendant is
clearly stated in Drinkwater v. Cooperage Co., 208 Pa. 649.
As to the fourth assignment, we quote from Harvey v. Coal
Co., supra: "In en action to recover damages for injury to property
caused by the negligent escape of coal dust from a breaker, tke
measure of damages is the cost of restoring the premises to their
condition before they twere injured, unless such cost equals or exceeds their value, in which event the value is the measure of
damages; and second, the actual loss in rentals due to the injury
of the premises."
We have found nothing in the assignments of error calling for
further notice. They are all overruled and judgment is afflrmS&.
OPINION OF SUPREME I( OURT
The Coal Company had a right to extract the coal, end to
break ii and prepare it for market, If in so doing it -inflicted no
injury on others.
It may even inflict certain undefined and indefinable degrees of jnjury on others in so operating its coal breaker without liability. So implies Htaxvey v. Susquehanna coal Co., 201.
Pa. 63. Apparently, it may if not negligent, inflict any quantity
of loss on its neighbor, a ha r d doctrine, indeeid.
If any injury is caused by negligence for so much of it as it
so caused, the defendant would be liable.
If there are devices in existence, by wbich the amount of
escaping dust may be lessened, -there would be liability for injury
caused by such dust as here escaped -because of the omission to
employ such device.
The buden is on the person alleging negligence to prove it.
The proof might be indirect as well as direct. The degrees-of the
injury from dust might warrant an inference that Qer
W
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been neglect to use proper methods, or proper appliances, in. the
absence of evidence of the methods and appliances employed or
of their appropriateness.
The damages recoverable would -be the cost of restoring the
property to its former condition, and the value of the use of it,
-of 'which the plaintiff would be deprived, during the process of
restoration, or, -if less than their cost, the value vf the building.
Judgment Effirmed. -

CARTER'S ESTATE
Wills-Life :Estate-.Widow-Power of Sale--4nterest of Remain derman

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Carter died owning $5000 in personal property and $7500 in
three houses and lots. He left a testamentary paper: "I give
after my death, -to my wife all my property, real and personal.
After her death it is to be divided among my brothers Charles,
Henry and Ralph, but my wife may sell any, if necessary for
her support, and consume the proceeds in maintaining herself."
The three brothers, denying that the power to sell applies to the
houses, have contracted to convey them in fee, subject to the
wife's life estate. The vendee refuses to accept the deed.
Frailey, for plaintiff.
Goldsmith, for defendant.
OFNN OF THE COURT
GANGE)WER, J. There are two questions to be decided-in
this case: (1) Does the power to sell apply to the realty as wbll
as the personalty? (2) :Have the brothers a marketable title?
[En Catharine Yetzer vs. Louis X. Brisse, 190 Pa. 346, the testator directed as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath to my
beloved wife all my estate, real, personal and mixed of 'vhatsoever kind * * * for her to have, to hold and enjoy during 'her
natural life, or so long as she shall remain my widow. I also order
and direct that in case my wife cannot support and maintain herself from my real etate, she is hereby authorized to sell the same
and use the proceeds for -her support and maintenance * * *
and after the decease or remarriage of my 'wife, Catharine, I dispose of all the rest and resMde of my estate real, personal and
mixed * * * to two sons and a daughter, share and share alike."
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It was there held that the wife had a discretionary power to sell,
and could make a good title to the testator's real estate upon
her declaration that she could not support and maintain herself
from the real estate.
In Mecurs Estate, 151 Pa. 49, it was held that a gift to a
widow of all the testator's estate after payment of debts "for her
sole use and benefit during the term of her natural life, to use,
expend, sell and convey as she may desire and think proper" with
a gift of the residue over upon her decease, vests in the widow
an absolute power of disposition over the testator's estate.
"Where," says Sir Edward Sudgen, "the intention is clear,
a power may enable the donee to dispose of dIe fee, though no
words of inheritance be used, as where a testator gives a power
to sell lands, the ;ionee may sell the inheritance, because the testator gives the same power he himself had. To enable the donee
of the power to convey a fee, it is not necessary, when it appears
that the donor intended to authorize such grant, that he should
specify the estate, it is enough if the power be merely to sell."
Hemhauser v. Decker, 38 N. J. Eq. 430, citing 1 Sugden on Powers 501.
It was said by Stewart, P. J., and affirmed by the Supreme
Court in Henninger v. Henninger, 202 Pa. 209: "There is no repugnance between a devise for a life term and a superadded power of sale or devise. Both may operate, and when the power of
sale is executed, it is, where it is not otherwise ordered, simply
a substitute of one kind of property for another; the estate of
those interested remaining the same in the thing substituted."
In Allen v. Hirlinger, 219 Pa. 56, the testator directed the
payment of his debts and a small legacy to his daughter and then
devised the residue of his estate to his 'wife for life or widowhood,
with permission to use and live therefrom and to have the full
ownership, the same as he had himself during his life, and at
her death whatever should remain to be given to his daughter.
It was there -held that -the gift was expressly of the estate, real,
personal and mixed, blended together, and no distinction was made.
We can readily see from the above quoted authorities that the
power to sell applies to the reality as well as to the personalty.
The testator prescribed no limit. He authorized her "to sell any"
of his real and personal property and did not limit her to the
personalty as the counsel for the defense contends. The -testator
made no distinction between the real and personal, but gives her
the right to sell either by saying "any." The wife, by selling
any part of the reality, not only sells her interest therein but
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conveys a fee, and the rights of the remainderman will attach to
the proceeds.
The widow, by the authority of the cases cited above, has
the power to convey any or all of the real estate. Obviously it
would not be equitable to compel the vendee to accept the interest
the brothers might get in the real estate, when at any time during the life of the widow she could defeat the interest the brothers
would get, by merely exercising her power to sell. The brothers
contracted to convey a fee subject to the wife's life estate, this
the widow could easily defeat, and by defeating it the vendee
would get nothing for what he paid a good and fair consideration.
The second question is, What is a marketable title? Sharswood, J., speaking for the court in Swayne v. Lyon, 67 Pa. 439,
said: "It has been well and wisely settled that under a contract
for the sale of real estate, the vendee has the right not merely
to have conveyed to him a good but an indubitable title. Only
such a title is deemed marketable, for otherwise the purchaser
may be buying a lawsuit, which will be a very serious loss to
him both of time and money, even if he ultimately succeeds. Hence
it has been often held that a title is not marketable where it
exposes the party holding it to litigation."
"In equity a -marketable title is one in which there is no doubt
involved, either as to matter of law or fact. Every title is doubtful which invites or exposes the party holding to litigation."
Herman v. Somers, 158 Pa. 424.
In Speakman v. Forepaugh, 44 Pa. 371, Strong, J. delivering the opinion, it is held: "If there be a color of an outstanding
title which may prove substantial, though there is not enough
in evidence to enable the chancellor to say that it is so, a purchaser 'vill not be held to take it, and encounter hazard of litigation with an adverse claimant"
"A vendee of real estate who was entitled under his contract to receive a marketable title to the premises, is under no obligation to take a title, which even if it might be finally determined to be good, is in a condition to involve him in litigation to establish or secure it. STolovitz v. Margulis, 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 252.
Considering the preceding authorities we think the brothers
do not have a marketable title. Should the widow be in need
of funds to support and maintain herself after the sale of all
the personal property and take advantage of her power to sell
and would sell part or all of the real property, she would not only
convey her life estate in the three houses and lots, but would also
convey all the estate the testator -had in the property, and it would
take with it the interest of the remaindermen, the three brothers.
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The vendee has a right not merely to a good but an indubitable
title, and in the case at bar the brothers cannot pass an indubitable title for the reasons before mentioned.
'For the reasons herein stated we entered judgment for the
defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUBPE

OR COURT

It seems to be admitted by all concerned that if the power
of sale given to the widow by the will authorized her to convey a
fee simple estate in the realty, the title of the brothers of the
testator was not marketable and the vendee was justified in refusing to accept their deed.
The power of sale embraced the realty as well as the personaltyp. Coover's ,Est., 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 13; Henninger v. Henninger,
202 Pa. 207; Kennedy v. Pittsburgh R. R., 216 Pa. 575. The language of the court in Allen v. Hirlinger, 219 Pa. 56, is applicable to this case. "The gift is expressly of the estate real and
personal end no distinction is made. There was no distinction in
the testator's own ownership during his life and there is nothing
to indicate an intention to make. a difference in 'her's after his
death. There was no limit put on her use. If she needed the
whole she was to have the 'whole." As said. in Hagenbuch's Est.,
25 'D. R. 686; "He does not distinguish between real and personal estate so that the power given to the widow is not restricted to either."
The porwer to sell authorized the widow to sell the fee simple. Allen v. Hirlinger, 219 Pa. 56. -No authority contained in or
conferred by the will was necessary to enable her to sell 'her life
estate. This she could have done at any. time Without specific
authority. Whatever intetest she had in the estate was hers to
dispose of, but the testator desired to confer, as to the authority
to dispose of the estate, greater power than this and he therefore gave her power and authority to sell the entire estate.
The power to sell was contingent upon a sale being necessary for her support. -But the probability that such a sale will
be necessary is not shown by the facts to be so remote as to authorize us in declaring that the power is not an incumbrance upon
the title of the brothers, which renvlers it unmarketable.
Judgment affirmed.

